Abstract-We study the cooperation of the mobile network operator (MNO) and the venue owners (VOs) on the public Wi-Fi deployment. We consider a one-to-many bargaining framework, where the MNO bargains with VOs sequentially to determine where to deploy Wi-Fi and how much to pay. Taking into account the negative externalities among different steps of bargaining, we analyze the following two cases: for the exogenous bargaining sequence case, we compute the optimal bargaining solution on the cooperation decisions and payments under a predetermined bargaining sequence; for the endogenous bargaining sequence case, the MNO decides the bargaining sequence to maximize its payoff. Through exploring the structural property of the optimal bargaining sequence, we design a low-complexity Optimal VO Bargaining Sequencing (OVBS) algorithm to search the optimal sequence. More specifically, we categorize the VOs into three types based on the impact of the Wi-Fi deployment at their venues, and show that it is optimal for the MNO to bargain with these three types of VOs sequentially. Numerical results show that compared with the random and worst bargaining sequences, the optimal bargaining sequence improves the MNO's payoff by up to 14.8 and 45.3 percent, respectively.
T HE proliferation of mobile devices has lead to an explosive growth of global mobile data traffic, so the mobile network operators (MNOs) are seeking innovative approaches to expand the network capacity and improve users' quality of experience. With the recent technology developments and standardization efforts (e.g., Hotspot 2.0 and the access network discovery and selection function [2] ), Wi-Fi data offloading has emerged as an important approach to alleviate cellular congestion. A recent study [3] showed that WiFi has offloaded 65 percent of total mobile traffic in the major cities in Korea. Furthermore, the Wireless Broadband Alliance's report [4] estimated that the annual global Wi-Fi deployment rate will increase to 10.5 million in 2018.
Instead of building their own Wi-Fi hotspots, many MNOs have been collaborating with venue owners (VOs), which are the owners of public places such as shopping malls and stadiums, on hotspot installment [4] . Since a large volume of cellular data traffic is generated from these crowded public places, MNOs are especially interested in deploying hotspots at these venues to relieve the traffic congestion. With the location information provided by Wi-Fi hotspots, MNOs can also earn profits by delivering contextaware mobile advertisements to mobile users. 1 Meanwhile, VOs also welcome the MNOs' help in building the carriergrade Wi-Fi, which usually provides a higher capacity and better integration with the cellular network than a regular Wi-Fi [5] , hence significantly enhances the mobile users' experience and attracts more visitors to those Wi-Fi available venues. Moreover, the carrier-grade Wi-Fi can help both MNOs and VOs collect visitor analytics, provide locationbased services, and promote products or activities [4] , [5] . Therefore, both MNOs and VOs benefit from the Wi-Fi deployment and have incentives to provide Wi-Fi service cooperatively. For example, AT&T has been cooperating with some VOs (such as Starbucks) to install the public Wi-Fi networks [6] . Although this kind of MNO-VO cooperation is increasingly popular, the detailed economic interactions among MNOs and VOs still have not been sufficiently explored and understood by the existing literatures. This motivates us to extensively analyze both MNOs and VOs' strategies in the cooperative Wi-Fi deployment in this paper.
Our Work
We consider a case where both MNOs and VOs have considerable market power, and study the cooperative Wi-Fi deployment problem under the one-to-many bargaining framework. 2 Specifically, a monopoly MNO bargains with multiple VOs sequentially, i.e., at each step, the MNO bargains with only one VO for deploying Wi-Fi at the corresponding venue. 3 We analyze the bargaining solution of 1 . Although the MNO can also deliver advertisements through the cellular network, users are much more receptive to advertising through Wi-Fi due to their voluntary use of Wi-Fi [5] . Furthermore, Wi-Fi usually provides more accurate user localization, and is more suitable for supporting multimedia advertisement due to the higher data rate. each step, including the cooperation decision and payment, by using the Nash bargaining theory [9] . Since the MNO's willingness to deploy new hotspots decreases as the number of deployed hotspots increases, the cooperation between the MNO and a particular VO imposes a negative externality to the bargaining among the MNO and other VOs. Such an externality significantly complicates the analysis. There are very few literatures studying the one-to-many bargaining, especially under the Nash bargaining theory. Our work provides a systematic study on this problem.
In the first part of this paper, we study the exogenous bargaining sequence scenario, where the MNO bargains with VOs sequentially according to a predetermined bargaining sequence. We take into account the data offloading benefit, Wi-Fi operation cost, advertising profit, and business revenue of the MNO and VOs. In particular, we differentiate the MNO's data offloading benefit at a venue during different time periods (e.g., daytime and nighttime). We would like to answer the following key questions: (i) Which VOs should the MNO cooperate with? (ii) How much should the MNO pay these VOs? We apply backward induction to compute the optimal bargaining solution on the cooperation decisions and payments.
In the second part of this paper, we study the endogenous bargaining sequence scenario, where the MNO first determines the bargaining sequence and then bargains with VOs accordingly. We want to answer the following key question: Under what bargaining sequence can the MNO maximize its payoff? Based on the analysis in the first part, we can compute the MNO's payoff under a fixed bargaining sequence. However, due to the complex structure of the one-to-many bargaining, we often cannot obtain the closed-form solution of such a payoff. Therefore, it is very challenging to directly compare the MNO's payoffs under all possible bargaining sequences and determine the optimal one.
To tackle the high complexity of the optimal sequencing problem, we first establish an important structural property of the one-to-many bargaining. More precisely, we categorize VOs into three types based on the impact of the Wi-Fi deployment at their venues. We show that there exists a group of optimal bargaining sequences, under which the MNO bargains with these three types of VOs sequentially. As a result, we design an Optimal VO Bargaining Sequencing (OVBS) algorithm that searches for the optimal bargaining sequence from a significantly reduced set. In fact, the structural property we prove in this paper is general, and is valid for many other one-to-many bargaining problems. We further characterize two special system settings, where we can explicitly determine the optimal sequence without running OVBS.
In t he third part of this paper, we study the influence of the bargaining sequence on the VOs' payoffs. Our analysis shows that: (i) When VOs are homogenous, it is beneficial for a VO to bargain with the MNO as early as possible; (ii) When VOs are heterogenous, "the earlier the better" is no longer true in general.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
Study of the one-to-many bargaining with cooperation cost: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work studying the one-to-many bargaining with the cooperation cost (i. There are a few literatures studying the MNO's Wi-Fi access point deployment problem. Zheng et al. in [10] proposed WiFi access point deployment algorithms, which provide the worst-case guarantee to the interconnection gap for vehicular Internet access. Wang et al. in [11] exploited users' mobility patterns to deploy Wi-Fi access points, aiming at maximizing the continuous Wi-Fi coverage for mobile users. Bulut et al. in [12] analyzed some real user mobility traces and deployed Wi-Fi access points based on the density of users' data access requests. Liao et al. in [13] investigated the Wi-Fi access point deployment problem with the consideration of both the coverage and localization accuracy. Poularakis et al. in [14] studied a joint Wi-Fi access point deployment and Wi-Fi service pricing problem. These works focused on a single MNO's Wi-Fi deployment decision, and did not consider the VOs, who may collaborate with the MNO and compensate the MNO's Wi-Fi deployment cost.
Economics of VOs' Wi-Fi Networks
There have been many literatures studying the mobile data offloading market, where the MNOs lease the VOs' (or resident users') Wi-Fi networks to offload the cellular data traffic. For example, Iosifidis et al. in [15] designed an iterative double auction mechanism for an offloading market, where the MNOs compete to lease the VOs' Wi-Fi networks for data offloading. The authors proposed an efficient allocation and payment rule that maximizes the social welfare.
References [16] , [17] , [18] designed reverse auctions for an MNO to motivate the VOs to offload the cellular traffic. Gao et al. in [8] applied a bargaining framework to study a similar Wi-Fi capacity trading problem. Furthermore, Yu et al. in [19] focused on the VOs' optimal Wi-Fi monetization strategies by considering the Wi-Fi advertising technique. However, these works assumed that the Wi-Fi networks have already been deployed and are owned by the VOs. They did not study the VOs' cooperation with the MNO in deploying the Wi-Fi networks.
One-to-Many Bargaining
In terms of the one-to-many bargaining, the most relevant works are [8] , [20] . Both papers studied the one-to-many bargaining under the Nash bargaining theory. However, since they did not consider the cooperation cost, their conclusion was that the bargaining sequence does not affect the buyer's payoff, and their analysis was limited to the one-to-many bargaining with exogenous sequence. In our work, we take into account the cooperation cost (i.e., Wi-Fi deployment and operation cost), which complicates the one-to-many bargaining with exogenous sequence. Such a consideration also motivates us to study the one-to-many bargaining with endogenous sequence. References [21] , [22] , [23] studied several one-to-many bargaining problems, where the buyer bargains with multiple sellers on a joint project that requires the cooperation from all the participants. It is different from our problem, as here the MNO may only cooperate with a subset of the VOs on the Wi-Fi deployment. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the system model. In Section 3, we analyze the bargaining between the MNO and a single VO. In Sections 4 and 5, we study the one-to-many bargaining with exogenous and endogenous bargaining sequences, respectively. In Section 6, we investigate the impact of the bargaining sequence on the VOs. We provide the numerical results in Section 7, and conclude the paper in Section 8.
SYSTEM MODEL

Basic Settings
We consider one mobile network operator, who operates multiple macrocells and bargains with venue owners to deploy Wi-Fi access points. For simplicity, we assume that each venue (such as a cafe) has a limited space and hence is covered by only one cellular macrocell. Since deploying WiFi at a particular venue only offloads traffic for the corresponding macrocell under our assumption and does not benefit other macrocells, the MNO can consider the Wi-Fi deployments for different macrocells separately. Without loss of generality, we study the MNO's strategy within one macrocell.
We consider a set N , 1; 2; . . . ; N f gof VOs, whose venues are non-overlapping but covered by the same macrocell. According to [24] , the mobile traffic exhibits a periodical daily pattern. Hence, we divide a day equally into T 2 1; 2; . . . f gtime periods, and assume that when Wi-Fi is deployed at venue n, 4 the expected amount of offloaded macrocell traffic during the tth (t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ) time period is X t n ! 0. We define
as the offloading vector of VO n. Each VO n 2 N is further characterized by parameters R n , C n , and A n :
R n ! 0 denotes the extra revenue that Wi-Fi creates for VO n's business (e.g., via attracting more customers and collecting customer analytics) 5 ; C n ! 0 denotes the total cost for the MNO to deploy and operate Wi-Fi at venue n, including the installment fee, management cost, and backhaul cost 6 ; A n ! 0 denotes the advertising profit to the MNO when Wi-Fi is deployed at venue n. 7 We assume that the information of X X n , R n , C n , and A n for all n 2 N is known to the MNO and all VOs. 8 This allows us to focus on studying the optimal bargaining decisions in this paper. In our future work, we will further analyze how incomplete and asymmetric information affects the cooperation among the MNO and VOs.
MNO's Payoff, VO's Payoff, and Social Welfare
We use b n 2 0; 1 f g to denote the bargaining outcome between the MNO and VO n: b n ¼ 1 if they agree on the WiFi deployment at venue n, and b n ¼ 0 otherwise. We use p n 2 R to denote the MNO's payment to VO n. 9 As we will see in Sections 3 and 4, under the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), p n ¼ 0 whenever b n ¼ 0, i.e., there is no transfer if no agreement is reached.
To simplify the notations, we define
as the bargaining outcomes and payments between the MNO and the first n 2 N VOs, respectively. 4 . To simplify the description, we use venue n to refer to VO n's venue.
5. Different from X X n , we aggregate the extra revenues obtained by VO n during different time periods into a single parameter R n . The reason is that VO n's payoff is linear in R n , as we will discuss in Section 2.2. Hence, considering the total value leads to the same result as considering different values in different time periods. Similar explanations apply for the definitions of parameters C n and A n .
6. In practice, some VOs undertake the backhaul cost for the MNO. This can be easily incorporated into our analysis by properly redefining R n and C n .
7. Sometimes VOs promote their products via Wi-Fi, and we include the corresponding advertising profit in R n .
8. In practice, the MNO and VOs can estimate these parameters. For example, parameter X X n can be estimated by combining the results in [3] and [24] , which studied the spatial-temporal distribution of cellular traffic and the percentage of offloaded cellular traffic, respectively. Parameters R n and A n are mainly determined by the statistics like the number of customers and the customers' average sojourn time, which can be estimated by the method proposed in [25] . Parameter C n can be estimated based on [26] , which showed the Wi-Fi hotspots' detailed capital expenditures (e.g., equipment fees) and operating expenses (e.g., backhaul costs, power costs, and maintenance fees).
9. We allow p n to be negative, in which case VO n pays the MNO. This will be the case when deploying Wi-Fi is more beneficial to VO n than to the MNO. The MNO's payoff depends on the offloading benefit, advertising profit, Wi-Fi deployment and operation cost, and its payment to VOs. Based on b b N and p p N , the MNO's payoff is
Here, f t Á ð Þ; t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T; is an increasing and concave function with f t 0 ð Þ ¼ 0, 10 and P N n¼1 b n X t n is the MNO's total offloaded traffic from all the N venues during the tth time period. Hence, f t P N n¼1 b n X t n characterizes the offloading benefit of the MNO during the tth time period, and
is the MNO's total offloading benefit of all time periods. 11 Furthermore, P N n¼1 b n A n and P N n¼1 b n C n describe the MNO's total advertising profit and total cost, respectively. Term P N n¼1 p n is the MNO's total payment to the VOs. VO n's payoff depends on the revenue directly brought by Wi-Fi and the MNO's payment as
The social welfare is the aggregate payoff of the MNO and all VOs:
where for each VO n 2 N , we define
Here Q n captures the increase in social welfare by deploying Wi-Fi at venue n, excluding the data offloading effect. Hence, we call Q n as the net benefit of deploying Wi-Fi at venue n without considering the data offloading benefit. We summarize the key notations in this paper in Table 1 , including some notations to be discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
Since the payment terms are cancelled out in (5), the social welfare only depends on the bargaining outcomes
ð Þ between the MNO and N VOs.
ONE-TO-ONE BARGAINING
We first study a special case where there is only one VO, i.e., N j j ¼ 1. We analyze the one-to-one bargaining under the Nash bargaining theory, which helps us better understand the more general results in the later sections. The Nash bargaining solution [9] of the one-to-one bargaining solves the following problem:
Here, U 0; 0 ð Þ and V 1 0; 0 ð Þ are the disagreement points of the MNO and VO 1 (the only VO), which are equal to their payoffs when no agreement is reached. Through setting b 1 ¼ 0 and p 1 ¼ 0 in (3) and (4), we obtain U 0; 0 ð Þ ¼ 0 and
The NBS essentially maximizes the product of the MNO and VO 1's payoff gains over their disagreement points. Intuitively, with a higher disagreement point, the MNO (or the VO) can obtain a larger payoff under the NBS.
We further define p 1 , V 1 b 1 ; p 1 ð Þ as the payoff of VO 1. This enables us to rewrite problem (7) with respect to p 1 and C b 1 ð Þ:
Problems (7) and (8) are equivalent, in the sense that given any bargaining solution in terms of b 1 ; p 1 ð Þ, we can compute the equivalent bargaining solution in terms of 
MNO's and VO n's disagreement points at step n U 
MNO's eventual payoff after bargaining 10 . Notice that the situation where function f t Á ð Þ is linear for all t is a special case of our framework. In this case, there is no externality among different steps of bargaining, and the one-to-many bargaining problem degenerates to N independent one-to-one bargaining between the MNO and each VO.
11. Reference [8] used a similar function to characterize the MNO's serving cost reduction due to the data offloading. However, [8] did not consider the temporal heterogeneity of the offloaded traffic, while our work defines the offloading benefit function f t Á ð Þ for each time period t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T.
We show the closed-form optimal solution to (8) in the following proposition.
12 Proposition 1. The optimal solution to problem (8) is
where
Proposition 1 indicates that if reaching an agreement increases the social welfare, i.e., C 1 ð Þ ! C 0 ð Þ ¼ 0, the MNO will deploy Wi-Fi at venue 1 and equally share the generated social welfare with VO 1; otherwise no Wi-Fi will be deployed, and both the MNO and VO 1 will obtain zero payoff.
ONE-TO-MANY BARGAINING WITH EXOGENOUS SEQUENCE
In this section, we study the case where the MNO bargains with N VOs sequentially under a fixed sequence. We illustrate the bargaining protocol in Fig. 1 . At each step, the MNO bargains with one VO n 2 N on b n ; p n ð Þ. We define p n as VO n 2 N 's payoff. As we have discussed in Section 3, bargaining on b n ; p n ð Þ and bargaining on b n ; p n ð Þare equivalent. Therefore, in Sections 4 and 5, we present the NBS in the form of b n ; p n ð Þto simplify the notations. Similar to b b n and p p n , we define
as the payoffs of the first n VOs. Without loss of generality, we assume that the bargaining sequence follows 1; 2; . . . ; N, i.e., the MNO bargains with VO n at step n 2 N . In Section 4.1, we formulate the bargaining problem for step n. In Section 4.2, we apply backward induction to compute the NBS for step n.
Bargaining Problem for
Step n 2 N At step n 2 N , the MNO bargains with VO n. We define U 0 n and V 0 n as the MNO's and VO n's disagreement points, respectively. Furthermore, when the MNO and VO n agree on b n ; p n ð Þ, we define their payoffs by U 1 n and V 1 n , respectively. Similar as (7), we formulate the Nash bargaining problem at step n as
Because VO n has a zero disagreement point if not reaching an agreement with the MNO, we have V 0 n ¼ 0. Moreover, based on the definition of p n , we have V 1 n ¼ p n . However, the computation of U 0 n and U 1 n are challenging, as the MNO's payoff depends on the bargaining results of all the N steps. In the next section, we compute U 0 n and U 1 n by backward induction, and solve problem (11) to obtain the NBS for step n.
NBS for
Step n 2 N We use backward induction to solve problem (11) from step n ¼ N to step n ¼ 1.
4.2.1
Step N Suppose that the MNO has already bargained with VO 1; . . . ; N À 1, and has reached b b NÀ1 and p p NÀ1 . It now bargains with VO N.
The MNO's disagreement point is
Here, C b b NÀ1 ; 0 ð Þ is the social welfare when the bargaining outcomes of all N steps are given as b b NÀ1 ; 0 ð Þ , i.e., assuming that no agreement is reached in step N. We obtain U 0 N by subtracting the first N À 1 VOs' payoffs from the social welfare. 13 If the MNO reaches b N ; p N ð Þ with VO N in step N, its payoff is 
where we define 12. The detailed proofs of the propositions and theorems in this paper are given in our technical report [27] . 13 . Notice that when no agreement is reached in step N, we have p N ¼ 0. Hence, we do not need to subtract p N from the social welfare in (12) .
negative, the MNO and VO N will reach an agreement and equally share the generated revenue; otherwise no agreement is reached. This is similar as the one-to-one bargaining in Section 3.
We can also understand D N b b NÀ1 ð Þ as the increase in social welfare by deploying Wi-Fi at venue N. This is because VO N is the last one that the MNO bargains with. For a general bargaining step n 2 N , we will later show that D n b b nÀ1 ð Þ is generally not equal to the increase in social welfare by deploying Wi-Fi at venue n.
Based on (14) , b
4.2.2
Step N À 1
Suppose that the MNO has already bargained with VO 1; . . . ; N À 2, and has reached b b NÀ2 and p p NÀ2 . It now bargains with VO N À 1.
The MNO's disagreement point is (14) .
If the MNO reaches b NÀ1 ; p NÀ1 ð Þwith VO N À 1 in step N À 1, its payoff is
Here b
Þare also determined by (14) .
Based on U 0 NÀ1 in (16) and U 1 NÀ1 in (17), we solve problem (11) for n ¼ N À 1 and obtain the NBS for step N À 1
where we define
If we treat the MNO and VO N À 1 as a coalition, then ð Þ, we can write the MNO's disagreement point at step k as
Here, B If the MNO reaches b k ; p k ð Þwith VO k, its payoff is
Based on U 0 k in (21) and U 1 k in (22), we solve problem (11) for n ¼ k and obtain the NBS for step k: where we define
If we treat the MNO and VO k as a coalition, D k b b kÀ1 ð Þ characterizes the increase of the coalition's payoff by deploying Wi-Fi at venue k, considering the responses of VOs k þ 1; . . . ; N.
Step 1
The analysis of step 1 is similar to that of step k, k ¼ 2; 3; . . . ; N À 2, except that for step 1, there is no prior bargaining outcome. To save space, we skip the computation of U 
MNO's Payoff After Bargaining
After applying backward induction to the analysis from step N to 1, we can eventually obtain the bargaining outcomes in all steps and all VOs' payoffs, and we denote them byb b N ¼b 1 ; . . . ;b N andp p N ¼p 1 ; . . . ;p N ð Þ . Based onb b N andp p N , we can easily compute the MNO's eventual payoff as
Engineering Insights
Here we summarize the insights from the above analysis of the one-to-many bargaining under a fixed bargaining sequence. First, we find that the NBS of a particular step depends on the Wi-Fi deployment decisions of all the prior bargaining steps. This is because the more Wi-Fi networks the MNO has already deployed, the less motivation it has to deploy a new Wi-Fi network. On the other hand, since such a negative externality is not related to the payments among the MNO and VOs, the NBS of a particular step is independent of the payments of all the prior bargaining steps.
Second, the MNO may cooperate with the VOs nonconsecutively. As we will discuss in Example 3 in Section 5.3, under a particular bargaining sequence, the MNO does not cooperate with a VO in the middle, while reaching agreements with VOs before and after the middle VO.
ONE-TO-MANY BARGAINING WITH ENDOGENOUS SEQUENCE
In this section, we study the one-to-many bargaining with endogenous sequence, where the bargaining sequence is selected by the MNO to maximize its payoff. In Section 5.1, we illustrate the influence of the bargaining sequence on the MNO's payoff through two examples. In Section 5.2, we formulate the MNO's optimal bargaining sequencing problem. In Section 5.3, we solve the problem through an Optimal VO Bargaining Sequencing algorithm. In Sections 5.4 and 5.5, we study two special cases, where we can explicitly determine the optimal bargaining sequence without running OVBS.
Examples on the Influence of Bargaining Sequence
Based on the analysis in Section 4, we present two examples in Fig. 2 to illustrate that the bargaining sequence can significantly affect the bargaining solutions and the MNO's payoff.
Example 1. The MNO first bargains with VO red and then bargains with VO white. We apply the backward induction and start the analysis from step 2. We first consider the case where the MNO reaches an agreement with VO red in step 1. By taking N ¼ 2 and
e., the MNO does not cooperate with VO white in this case. We further consider the case where the MNO does not reach an agreement with VO red in step 1. By taking N ¼ 2 and
Hence, we obtain from (14) that b 
Since D 1 > 0, based on (25), we have b
Example 2. The MNO first bargains with VO white and then bargains with VO red. We start the analysis from step 2. We first consider the case that the MNO reaches an agreement with VO white in step 1, we have
, the MNO does not cooperate with VO red in this case. We further consider the case that the MNO does not reach an agreement with VO white in step 1, we have
e., the MNO cooperates with VO red in this case, and VO red's payoff is 0.5.
Next we come to the analysis of step 1, where the MNO bargains with VO white. Based on b
ð Þ, and p (26), we can compute D 1 as
Since D 1 > 0, we have b
Therefore, the eventual bargaining outcome isb 1 ¼ 1,b 2 ¼ 0,
Comparing Examples 1 and 2, we find that the MNO obtains different payoffs under different bargaining sequences. Through exchanging the bargaining positions of the two VOs (red and white), the MNO's payoff U 0 improves from 0.875 to 1. This is due to the cooperation cost and the externality between the two bargaining steps. In our problem, the cooperation cost is the cost of deploying and operating Wi-Fi, which is denoted by C n and has been included in Q n based on (6) . Because of the cooperation cost, the MNO may not choose to cooperate with all VOs. 15 Moreover, the externality couples the analysis of the two bargaining steps, and makes the bargaining results dependent on the bargaining sequence.
Optimal Sequencing Problem
We use l l ¼ l 1 ; l 2 ; . . . ; l N ð Þto denote the bargaining sequence, i.e., the MNO bargains with VO l n 2 N at step n. We further define L as the set of all possible bargaining sequences: L , l l : l i ; l j 2N and l i 6 ¼ l j ; 8i 6 ¼ j; i; j 2 N È É :
We use U l l 0 to denote the MNO's payoff in (27) under bargaining sequence l l 2 L. The MNO's optimal sequencing problem is
i.e., choosing the optimal sequence l l Ã to maximize its payoff. To solve (30), we may apply the exhaustive search to compute the MNO's payoff for each l l 2 L and determine l l Ã accordingly. Since L j j ¼ N!, the computational complexity of this method is high. In the next section, we prove an important structural property for the one-to-many bargaining, which allows us to design an Optimal VO Bargaining Sequencing algorithm with a significantly lower complexity.
Structural Property and OVBS Algorithm
We categorize VOs into three types:
16
Recall that Q n is the net benefit of deploying Wi-Fi at venue n without considering the data offloading benefit. Term P T t¼1 f t X t n À Á is the offloading benefit brought by deploying Wi-Fi at venue n when the MNO does not deploy Wi-Fi at other venues. Since function f t Á ð Þ is concave for all t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T , term P T t¼1 f t X t n À Á can also be understood as the maximum possible offloading benefit brought by deploying Wi-Fi at venue n.
Based on the definition of the social welfare (5), the categorization in Definition 1 can be understood as follows:
For type 1 VO n, its cooperation with the MNO does not decrease the social welfare, i.e., C b 1 ; . . . and VO k belongs to type 1, where k 2 2; 3; . . . ; N f g , the 15 . As we will discuss in Section 5.4, references [8] and [20] did not consider the cooperation cost, in which case the buyer's payoff is independent of the bargaining sequence.
16. Notice that since
MNO's payoff does not decrease after exchanging VOs k À 1 and k's bargaining positions.
Proposition 5. If the bargaining sequence follows 1; 2; . . . ; N, and VO k belongs to type 3, where k 2 2; 3; . . . ; N f g , the MNO's payoff does not change after exchanging VOs k À 1 and k's bargaining positions. Now we are ready to state our main theorem, which describes the structural property of the optimal bargaining sequence. Notice that there may exist some optimal bargaining sequences that are not in set L Ã . Since our focus is to maximize the MNO's payoff by a properly chosen sequence, we will focus on set L Ã in the rest of this paper. Based on Theorem 1, we propose an Optimal VO Bargaining Sequencing algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1), which solves the optimal sequencing problem (30) as follows. In other words, l l RE is one of the optimal bargaining sequences for problem (30).
The basic idea of OVBS is to utilize Theorem 1 to reduce the searching space of l l Ã from set L to a new constructed set
, the complexity of determining l l Ã is significantly reduced. To summarize, the optimal sequence determined by OVBS has the following features: (a) The MNO bargains with the VOs sequentially in the order of type 1, type 2, and type 3 (Theorem 1); (b) The MNO will cooperate with all type 1 VOs (Proposition 2); (c) The MNO will not cooperate with any type 3 VO (Proposition 3); (d) Interchanging any two type 1 VOs' positions will not change the MNO's payoff (Theorem 1); (e) Interchanging any two type 3 VOs' positions will not change the MNO's payoff (Theorem 1).
We illustrate the optimal sequence's structure in Fig. 3 .
It is difficult to further reduce the searching space L RE , because the optimal sequencing problem involving type 2 VOs is very complicated in general. To see this, we show a counter-intuitive result in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If there are type 2 VOs, i.e., N 2 > 0, the MNO may cooperate with the VOs nonconsecutively under all the optimal bargaining sequences.
We show Example 3 in Fig. 4 to prove Proposition 6. 18 In Example 3, all VOs are of type 2, and the MNO has a unique optimal bargaining sequence, where it bargains with VOs red, white, and yellow sequentially. We find that the MNO only cooperates with VOs red and yellow under this optimal bargaining sequence. In other words, it is optimal for the MNO in this example to bargain with someone (VO white) that it will not cooperate with ahead of someone (VO yellow) that it will cooperate with. The reason for this counter-intuitive result is that such strategy increases the MNO's disagreement point at the first bargaining step, and hence helps the MNO earn more profit from the cooperation with VO red. Proposition 6 implies that besides the structural property described in Theorem 1, it is difficult to explore other structural properties to further reduce the complexity of OVBS. 17. Naturally, VO l N 1 þ1 ; l N 1 þ2 ; . . . ; l N 1 þN 2 are of type 2 when these two conditions are satisfied.
18. In Section 4.4, we use Example 3 to show that under a given bargaining sequence, the MNO may cooperate with the VOs nonconsecutively. Here, we use Example 3 to show that this can still happen even if the bargaining sequence is the optimal one.
(33) That is to say, when all VOs are sortable, we can explicitly determine the optimal bargaining sequence and identify those VOs that the MNO will cooperate with.
INFLUENCE OF BARGAINING SEQUENCE ON VOS' PAYOFFS
In this section, we study the influence of the bargaining sequence on VOs' payoffs. When VOs are homogenous, we prove that it is always no worse for a particular VO to bargain with the MNO at an earlier position. When VOs are heterogenous, we use an example to show that such "the earlier the better" feature is no longer true in general.
Homogenous VOs
We assume Q n ¼ Q and X t n ¼ X t for all n 2 N and t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T , and state the following theorem.
Theorem 5. If all VOs are homogenous, then for any bargaining sequence l l 2 L, we havep l i !p l j for any i < j; i; j 2 N .
Theorem 5 shows that the payoff of a VO with an earlier bargaining position is no smaller than the payoff of a VO with a later bargaining position. Since all VOs are homogenous, we conclude that it is always better for a particular VO to bargain with the MNO at an earlier position.
Notice that when VOs are homogenous, they are sortable based on Definition 2. Therefore, we can apply the conclusions in Theorem 4 and obtain the following corollary. 
Corollary 1 shows that the MNO only cooperates with the first k VOs, and the remaining N À k VOs obtain zero payoffs.
Heterogenous VOs
In Fig. 5 , we illustrate Examples 4 and 5, where there are two VOs and they are heterogenous in Q n . 19 We observe that, the red VO's payoff under the later bargaining position is higher than that under the earlier bargaining position. Intuitively, this can be understood as follows. The MNO only cooperates with the red VO in both cases. However, in the first case, the existence of the white VO serves as the "backup plan" for the MNO and allows the MNO to obtain a non-zero revenue even if the MNO fails to cooperate with the red VO. This increases the MNO's disagreement point in the first bargaining step, and allows the MNO to extract more revenue from its cooperation with the red VO. As a 19 . Similar examples where VOs are heterogenous in X X n are given in [27] .
result, compared with the second case, the red VO receives a lower payoff in the first case.
Examples 4 and 5 imply that when VOs are heterogenous, bargaining with the MNO at an earlier position may decrease the VO's payoff. This conclusion is very interesting, since it contrasts with literature [8] , which studies the one-to-many bargaining without cooperation cost and concludes that bargaining with the buyer earlier does not decrease the seller's payoff. In our problem, we show that this is not true when considering the cooperation cost.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the optimal sequencing and study the impact of system parameters on the bargaining.
Performance of Optimal Sequencing
First we define the criteria for evaluating the performance gap between different sequencing strategies. For a set N of VOs and the corresponding set L of bargaining sequences, we define the MNO's maximum, minimum, and average payoff as follows:
Hence, U NMG and NMD capture the performance improvement of the optimal sequence over the worst sequence and the random sequence, respectively.
Distributions of NMG and NMD
We choose N j j ¼ 5, T ¼ 2, and f t x ð Þ ¼ x 0:3 for t ¼ 1; 2, and study the probability distributions of NMG and NMD.
First, we assume that X t n and Q n follow the truncated normal distributions. Specifically, we obtain the distribution of X t n ; n 2 N ; t ¼ 1; 2, by truncating the normal distribution N 90; 900 ð Þto interval 60; 120 ½ . Moreover, we obtain the distribution of Q n ; n 2 N , by truncating the normal distribution N À6; 9 ð Þto interval À9; À3 ½ . We run the experiment 30,000 times, and record the probability mass functions of NMG and NMD in Fig. 6 . We conclude that, (i) compared with the worst sequence, the optimal sequence improves the MNO's payoff by 19.8 percent on average and by 45.3 percent in the extreme case; (ii) compared with the random sequence, the optimal sequence improves the MNO's payoff by 9.2 percent on average and by 14.8 percent in the extreme case.
Second, we consider the uniform distribution, and assume that X t n $ U 60; 120 ½ for all n; t, and Q n $ U À9; À3 ½ for all n. We illustrate the corresponding probability mass functions of NMG and NMD in Fig. 7 . We can see that the results are similar to those in Fig. 6 , which shows that the simulation results on NMG and NMD are robust to the assumption on probability distributions of the system parameters. To save space, we only simulate the truncated normal distributions for the system parameters in the rest of this section.
We summarize the observations in Figs. 6 and 7 as follows. Observation 1. For both the truncated normal distribution and the uniform distribution, the optimal bargaining sequence improves the MNO's payoff over the random and worst bargaining sequences by more than 9 and 19 percent on average, respectively.
Influences of E
We investigate the influences of the means of X t n and Q n on the performance of the optimal sequencing. The settings of N j j, T , and f t x ð Þ are the same as those in Section 7.1.1. Fig. 7 . Distributions of NMG and NMD (uniform distribution). È É . The benefit of the optimal sequencing is most significant for a medium E Q n f g.
We further investigate the influence of the concavity of function f t Á ð Þ on the performance of the optimal sequencing in Figs. 10 and 11. We choose the same settings on N j j, T , and the distributions of X t n and Q n as Fig 6. In Fig 10, we observe that the expected NMG reaches its peak value for medium c 1 and c 2 . This is because when both c 1 and c 2 are small, the offloading benefit for the MNO is small and most VOs are of type 3 as shown in Fig 11. Recall that the MNO never cooperates with these type 3 VOs. Hence, for small c 1 and c 2 , the optimal sequencing does not significantly improve the MNO's payoff. When both c 1 and c 2 are large, functions f 1 Á ð Þ and f 2 Á ð Þ become less concave. In this case, given the same number of deployed Wi-Fi networks, the MNO is more willing to deploy new Wi-Fi networks. That is to say, the externalities among different steps of bargaining become weaker. As a result, different bargaining steps are less tightly coupled, and the bargaining sequence has a smaller impact on the MNO's payoff. Therefore, the advantage of the optimal sequencing reduces and the expected NMG decreases.
We summarize the following observation for Figs. 10 and 11.
Observation 3. The benefit of the optimal sequencing is most significant when the offloading benefit function f t Á ð Þ has a medium concavity.
MNO's Payoff
In Figs. 12 and 13, we study the impact of different parameters on the MNO's maximum payoff, i.e., U . Based on (3), such a concavity is due to the concave offloading benefit function f t Á ð Þ. Since a larger c corresponds to a less concave function f t Á ð Þ, we observe in Fig 12 that an increase of c leads to a decrease of the concavity of the U max 0 curve.
Influence of E Q n f g
We use the same simulation settings on N j j, T , f t Á ð Þ, and the distributions of X t n and Q n as Fig 9. We change E Q n f g from À7 to 6 and illustrate the corresponding U max 0 in Fig 13. We find that U max 0
increases with E Q n f g, because a large E Q n f g implies a large benefit (or a small cost) of deploying Wi-Fi network, and the MNO can earn more profit from the cooperative Wi-Fi deployment. Furthermore, we find that U max 0 eventually linearly increases when E Q n f g ! 3.
To explain this, we also show the percentage of type 1 VOs in Fig 13 . As E Q n f g increases, the percentage of type 1 VOs approaches 100 percent. Based on (5) and (31), when all VOs are of type 1, we have
where B is defined in Theorem 3. Hence, U max 0 linearly increases with E Q n f g, and the slope of the curve is N=2. We conclude the following observations for Figs. 12 and 13. 
È É
, and the concavity of the curve increases with the concavity of function f t Á ð Þ. Moreover, the MNO's maximum payoff increases with E Q n f g. In particular, it linearly increases with E Q n f g when all VOs are of type 1.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the economic interactions among the MNO and VOs in the cooperative Wi-Fi deployment. We analyzed the problem under the one-to-many bargaining framework, with both exogenous and endogenous sequences. For the exogenous case, we applied backward induction to compute the bargaining results in terms of the cooperation decisions and payments for a given bargaining sequence. For the endogenous case, we proposed the OVBS algorithm that searches for the optimal bargaining sequence by leveraging the structural property. Furthermore, we studied the influence of the bargaining sequence on VOs, and found that when VOs are homogenous, the earlier bargaining positions are always no worse for the VOs. Numerical results showed that the optimal bargaining sequence significantly improves the MNO's payoff as compared with the random and worst bargaining sequences. We illustrated that the optimal sequencing is most beneficial when the offloading benefit functions have medium concavities.
In our future work, we will further consider the incomplete information scenario, where the MNO and the VO have limited information of the remaining VOs for each step of the bargaining. Moreover, we are interested in studying the MNO competition, where multiple MNOs compete for the VOs' cooperation. .
